

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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COUNTRY North Korea

REPORT

SUBJECT Jurisdiction and Activities of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs
in the P'anmunjom Area

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An explanation of the jurisdiction and activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) in the P'anmunjom Area, keyed to two attached sketches

The explanation of sketch No. 1 describes the area of responsibility in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The explanation of sketch No. 2 describes the facilities of the P'anmunjom Conference Site Police Affairs Department, Kaesong Security Division, Guard Bureau, MIA, and the Czechoslovak and Polish Delegations under the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission in the MIA responsible area of the DMZ. The report contains also information on travel, replacement, and other matters relating to the Czechoslovak and Polish Delegations; and activities of ambush teams at listening posts, passwords used, and document checks in the MIA responsible area.

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I. DetailsFacilities and Activities of the MIA Authorities and the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegation, NN&C in the MIA responsible area of the northern half part of the DMZ:

17 October 1958

1. Explanation of the Sketch of the P'angmunjŏn Area - Enclosure No. 1 of this report:

Figure 1. Residences of the MIA security officers assigned to the P'angmunjŏn Conference Site Police Affairs Department, Kaesŏng Security Division, Guard Bureau, MIA: There were ten houses here, of which four were built in about August 1956 with brick walls and gabled roofs of cement tiles, each measuring about 7 meters wide, 11 meters long, and 3.5 meters high, and the rest were constructed with wooden fabricated walls and gabled roofs of slate, each measuring about 6 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 2.5 meters high. Each of the ten was occupied by two households.

Figure 2. Two houses: Each of the two was built with brick walls and a gabled roof of cement tiles, measuring 7 meters wide, 11 meters long, and 3.5 meters high, in the summer of 1956. One was occupied by the family of the Chief, P'angmunjŏn Conference Site Police Affairs Department, while the other by the family of the Personnel Deputy Chief of the same department. A telephone was said to be installed in the residence of the former.

Figure 3: 1st Check Point of the Conference Site which was the official name called by the MIA authorities: Two MIA security officers disguised themselves as junior lieutenants of the North Korean People's Army (NKPA) were on duty on each shift at this check point relieving every six hours. There were two telephones at this check point. The security officers checked the documents and questioned the persons entering or leaving the MIA responsible area of the DMZ. Except for those cars in which the members of the NN&C and the senior members of both Chinese and North Korean Military Armistice Commission (NK MAC) and such officials as Commanding Officer, Kaesŏng Guard Battalion, Chief, Kaesŏng Security Division, and Chief, P'angmunjŏn Conference Site Police Affairs Department, were riding, the entire vehicles were required to stop for checkup. Even those vehicles which were usually exempted from the checkup as mentioned above could be forced to stop by the security officers if their suspicions were aroused. The drivers of the vehicles belonging to Kaesŏng Guard Battalion were allowed to pass the check point only by showing their trip tickets. All other vehicle drivers who were about to enter the MIA responsible area of the DMZ, except those who were going as far as the joint security area,

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should turn in their entrance certificates issued by the NK MAC headquarters at the first check point. If the vehicles were going into the joint security area where the conference hall was located, such vehicle driver should turn in their entrance certificates at the second check point (Figure 11 below), however, they had to show the security officers of the 1st check point their certificates before entering the MIA responsible area. When the ordinary personnel of the NK MAC and official visitors such as reporters and cameramen had left the NK MAC headquarters for the joint security area after obtaining their entrance certificates from the NK MAC headquarters, the duty officer of the NK MAC telephoned to both the 1st check point and the Police Affairs Officer of the Conference Site Police Affairs Department to inform them of the names, purpose, and other related information on the visitors in addition to the type of transportation to be used by the visitors. The security officers of the 1st check point compared the entrance certificates and bearers of the certificates with the information received from the NK MAC by phone for confirmation. When the visitors had passed through the 1st check point, the security officers of the 1st check point called up the 2nd check point to give that information. NK sight-seers or foreign visitors to the conference site were not allowed to pass the 1st check point unless they were escorted by officials of the Kaesong Security Division or the Police Affairs Officers of the Conference Site Police Affairs Department. The escorting officers were supposed to ride an escorting jeep of the NK MAC as though such visitors had been issued entrance certificates by the NK MAC. [redacted] it was difficult for the NK civilians to obtain entrance certificates. [redacted] a number of teachers and school staffs of Songdo Politics and Economics College in Kaesong tried hard to make a collective trip to the conference site but failed and only a couple of the top school personnel including the dean of the college were finally authorized. [redacted] KANG Sang-ho, Senior member of the NK MAC, was very sympathetic toward foreign visitors particularly Russians who wanted to see the conference site. No farmers were allowed to utilize the 1st check point in entering or leaving the MIA responsible area of the DMZ whatsoever. During the farming seasons, an estimated 100 farmers were seen farming in the MIA responsible area of the DMZ during daylight. Those farmers came in the area in the morning and retreated from the area in the evening. Those farmers were said to have been residing somewhere outside the northern boundary of the DMZ. They were escorted by the plain clothes MIA security officers belonging to the Conference Site Police Affairs Department in making their daily farming trip. They were always watched by the escorting officers while farming in the area, too. Such farmers were led by the escorting officers into the MIA responsible area passing through the check points of the DMZ Police Companies, NKPA, located on both sides

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of the MIA responsible area. The escorting officers were said to be living at the farm villages where those farmers were dwelling to escort them daily all the way between their homes and the DMZ. The escorting officers dropped in the Conference site Police Affairs Department once in a while to receive instructions.

Figure 4: Living quarters of the members of the 1st and 3rd Platoon, 1st Guard Company, Kaesŏng Guard Battalion and the office of each officer in the company: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls, of which the upper part was whitewashed and the lower part was coated with cement, with a gabled roof of cement tiles, measuring about 7 meters wide, 18 meters in total length, and 3.5 meters high, which were built in September 1957. The east-west portion of the building was partitioned to provide a private office for the Company Commander, the Political Deputy Company Commander, each of the four platoon leaders, and a duty officer, while the south-north portion of the building was utilized as the living quarters of the 1st and 3rd Platoon members. While the 1st Guard Company was in reserve in Kaesŏng city, the 2nd Guard Company occupied these facilities.

Figure 5: Living quarters of the 2nd and 4th Platoon, 1st Guard Company, Kaesŏng Guard Battalion: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls, of which the upper part was whitewashed and the lower part was coated with cement, and with a gabled roof of cement tiles, measuring 7 meters wide, 16 meters long, and 3.5 meters high, which was built in September 1957.

Figure 6: 1st Guard Company Club: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls which were whitewashed and a gabled roof of rice straw, measuring about 6 meters wide, 14 meters long, and 2.5 meters high, which was built in the summer of 1957. The club occupied the largest part of the building in which various meetings were held and the movies were shown to the 1st Guard Company personnel. The southern part of the building was occupied by the Company Sanitary Director's Office, the Library, the Room for Studying the History of KIM Il-sŏng's Anti-Japanese Partisan Struggle, and the Company Ammunition Storehouse.

Figure 7: Mess hall of the 1st Guard Company, Kaesŏng Guard Battalion: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls which were whitewashed and with a gabled roof of alates, measuring approximately 5 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high, which was capable of feeding 120 men at a time. The company had no permanently assigned kitchen personnel so that a five man group of privates and senior privates led by an assistant squad leader was detailed for cooking purpose every day on a rotating basis.

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Figure 8: Storehouse of the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalions: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls which were whitewashed and a gabled roof of rice straws, measuring about 5 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which 20 bags of rice, each containing 60 kg, about ten bags of wheat flour, sidedishes, and old clothing turned in by the company personnel were usually stored.

Figure 9: Facilities of the P'hamunjom Conference Site Police Affairs Department and the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegations of the NNSC: 50X1-HUM
Note: These facilities will be described in detail on the separate sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report.)

Figure 10: Old conference hall which has been unoccupied.

Figure 11: 2nd Check Point, Conference Site: Two MIA security officers disguised themselves as NKPA senior private, were on duty on each shift here, relieving every six hours. The check point was operated on a 24 hour basis. The security officers at this check point were informed by both Police Affairs Officer, Conference Site Police Affairs Department, and security officers of the 1st check point by phone when visitors to the conference site were coming toward the 2nd check point. The security officers of the 2nd check point double checked the visitors before permitting them to enter the joint security area, even if they carried arm-bands or North Korean flags were attached to their vehicles properly, in addition to receiving entrance certificate issued by the NK MAC from the visitors. All vehicles except for those in which the senior members of the Chinese and NK MAC and the members of the NNS were riding were stopped to comply with the checkup. The security officers of the 2nd check point carefully studied whether the visitors were the right persons about whom the Police Affairs Officer, Conference Site Police Affairs Department and the security officers of the 1st check point had informed a little while ago.

Figure 12: P'hamunjom bridge: This bridge to be built of concrete was under construction by an unspecified North Korean construction enterprise as of 17 October 1958.

Figure 13: Conference hall.

Figure 14: 3rd Check Point, Conference Site: This check point was temporarily established to perform similar duties to that of the 2nd check point inasmuch as the vehicles running between the 1st check point and the conference hall were required to run the bypass because of the untraffickability of the main road resulting from the construction of the P'hamunjom bridge (figure 12 above). This check point was to be removed upon completion of the construction of the said bridge.

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Figure 15: Kojong-san (name of a hill).

Figure 16: Indian Flag-pole Hill. During the exchange of the prisoners of War shortly after the signing of the Armistice agreement under the supervision of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission of which the [] Delegation was the chairman, the [] Flag was fluttering on the top of this high ground so that this high ground was called by the NK side the Indian Flag-pole Hill (Indo Kibbaldae Koji).

Figure 17: []

Figure 18: [] airport: Since this airport was located within the joint security area, it was called the "Joint airport", however, it was solely used by the representatives of the [] MAC when landing by helicopters.

Figure 19: Hill No. 3 named by the MIA security guards.

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Figure 20: Hill No. 4 named by the MIA security guards.

Figure 21: Hill No. 5 named by the MIA security guards.

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Figure 22: Hill No. 2 named by the MIA security guards.

Mark A: 1st Guard Post of the Compound of the Czechoslovakian Delegation, NNRC: The post was operated during a 24 hour basis to check the men and vehicles entering and leaving the compound of the Czechoslovakian Delegation. The guard assigned to this post on each shift was obliged to observe the area covering between the garage of the Czechoslovakian Delegation (figure 1 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report) and the garage of the P'ammunja Conference Site Police Affairs Department (figure 10 of the sketch Enclosure No. 2 of this report). This guard post was specially instructed to watch the vicinity of the garage of the Czechoslovakian Delegation due to the fact that the area was overgrown with acacia trees. The guard was limited to be roving around within a radius of five meters of the post for such an observation purpose. All vehicles, except for those belonging to any delegation of the NNRC, were not allowed to enter the compound of the Czechoslovakian Delegation unless authorized by the Chief of the Guards, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion, who performed his duty in compliance with the constant instruction of the Police Affairs Officer, Conference Site Police Affairs Department. In case the members of the [] Delegation of the NNRC were visiting the Czechoslovakian Delegation, they should not be interrupted by the guard at this entrance gate,

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however, the guard had to report it to the Chief of the Guards on duty immediately after letting the 50X1-HUM representatives enter the Czechoslovakian compound. The Chief of the Guards stayed in the Guard Office (figure 9 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report). As a means of reporting any incident while on duty at the guard post, the guard had to call either the leader of the sentinels or the Chief of the guards to come over to this guard post by signalling with an electric buzzer connected to the Guard Office or blowing a whistle carried by the guard. The guard at this post should give several short signals (- - - - -) for calling the Leader of the Sentinels, and should repeat one-short & one-long signal several times (- - - - -) for calling the Chief of the Guards. No telephone was available to the guard post from Mark A through Mark J.

- Mark B:** 2nd Guard Post, Czechoslovakian Delegation Compound: The post was operated 24 hours a day to watch the areas of the Gasoline storehouse (figure 2 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report), the Automobile Repair Shop (figure 3 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report), and the northern side of the garage of the Czechoslovakian Delegation (figure 1 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report). The guard was responsible for restricting the people from smoking in the area surrounding the Gasoline Storehouse. In case of calling the Leader of the Sentinels, the guard gave a two short signal several times, while a two short-one long signal several times for calling the Chief of the Guards.
- Mark C:** 3rd Guard Post, Czechoslovakian Delegation Compound: This post was operated during the hours of darkness in the emergency alert weeks which were settled before and after the major national holidays since the summer of 1956. The guard at this post gave a three short signal several times for calling the Leader of the Sentinels and a three short-one long signal for calling the Chief of the Guards.
- Mark D:** 4th Guard Post, Czechoslovakian Delegation Compound: The post was operated on a 24 hour basis for the purpose of guarding the living quarters and office of the senior member, Czechoslovakian Delegation (figure 7 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report) and watching the area between the 3rd Guard Post (Mark C) and a water tank tower (figure 31 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report). The guard of the 4th post was also responsible for observing the outbreak of a fire on the ground since this post was placed at highground. In event the guard desired to call out the Leader of the Sentinels to tell him something, he should give a four short signal several times. He should give a four short-one long signal several times for calling the Chief of the Guards either by buzzer or whistle.

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Mark E: 5th Guard Post, Czechoslovakian Delegation Compound: This post was operated only during the hours of darkness in the emergency alert weeks. The guard should give a five short signal several times for calling out the Leader of the Sentinels and a five short-one long signal several times for calling out the Chief of the Guards.

Mark F: 1st Guard Post, Compound of the Polish Delegation, NNSC: The post located at the entrance gate was operated on a 24 hour basis for the purpose of checking the persons and vehicles entering or leaving the Polish compound in addition to observing the area between the garage of the P'azmijem Conference Site Police Affairs Department (figure 10 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report) and Mark G. No visitors, except for the members of any delegation of the NNSC, were granted to enter this compound without obtaining a permission from the Chief of the Guards. The guard was limited to move around within a radius of five meters from his post for observation purpose. The signalling method was the same as that of the 1st Guard Post of the Czechoslovakian compound mentioned in Mark A above.

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Mark G: 2nd Guard Post of the Polish compound: The post was operated merely hours of darkness to guard the garage of the Polish Delegation (figure 29 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report) as well as observing the eastern area of the 2nd Guard Post and the area extending to Mark F. This post was ordered to stop all vehicles, except NNSC vehicles heading for the village of Chymal [] not authorized by the Chief of the Guards, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion. The signal method for calling the Leader of the Sentinels or the Chief of the Guards was the same as that of the 2nd Guard Post of the Czechoslovakian compound mentioned in Mark B above.

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Mark H: 3rd Guard Post of the Polish Delegation Compound: This post was operated on a 24 hour basis for guarding the Gasoline storehouse of the Polish Delegation (figure 30 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report) and observing the eastern area of this guard post and the area extending to Mark I. The guard kept standing by the northern wall of the Gasoline Storehouse at night instead of standing at the guard post. The signal method in calling the Leader of the Sentinels or the Chief of the Guards was the same as that of the 3rd Guard Post of the Czechoslovakian compound mentioned in Mark C above.

Mark I: 4th Guard Post, Polish Delegation Compound: The post was operated on a 24 hour basis for guarding the buildings of the Polish Delegation as well as observing the area covering between the Mark H and the water tank tower (figure 31 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 2 of this report). This post was responsible for watching for the outbreak of a fire within the Polish compound. The guard was

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limited to move around within a radius of five meters from his post for the purpose of observation. The signal method was the same as that of the 4th Guard Post of the Czechoslovakian compound mentioned in Mark D above.

Mark J: 5th Guard Post, Polish Delegation Compound: The post was operated only during the hours of darkness during the weeks of emergency alert. The signal method was the same as that of the 5th Guard Post of the Czechoslovakian compound mentioned in Mark E above.

Mark K: 3rd Guard Post, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion: This post was attached to the 3rd Check Point of the Conference Site (figure 14 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report) where two MIA security officers performed their duties. The guard members with the rank of senior private or private were assigned to the check point to help the security officers only during daytime. Two guards served from 0800 till 1400 hours and another two guards from 1400 till 1900 hours. When vehicles passed by, the guards opened the gate of the 3rd Check Point by order of the security officers. This guard post was expected to be removed as soon as the construction of the P'annun bridge was completed. The guard members assigned to this post ought to follow the instructions of the security officers of the 3rd Check Point.

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Mark L: 5th Guard Post, Conference Site: The post was established on a temporary basis for the period of constructing the P'annun bridge. It was manned by an MIA security officer who disguised himself as an NKPA senior private and a guard from the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion as of 17 October 1958. The extent of observation of this post was unknown

Mark M: 1st Guard Post, Conference Site: The post manned by an MIA security officer disguised himself as an NKPA senior private and a guard whose rank was either private or senior private was operated on a 24 hour basis. The functions of this post was to observe the vicinity of conference hall, the UNC airport (figure 18 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report), and the Indian Flag-pole Hill (figure 16 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report) in order to spot any violating act of UNC side against the terms of the Armistice agreement, and to check all North Korean visitors and vehicles whether they were carrying proper armbands and flags before letting them enter the conference hall area, and to protect members of the UNCC and Chinese and NK MAC. If the guards found anything that the elements of the UNC violated the terms of agreement in the vicinity of conference hall, they should report it to a Police Affairs Officer who was stationed in the Police Affairs Officer's Office nearby the conference hall without delay. During the MAC meetings, the guards were increased to about 4 to 6 to rove around the conference hall area. The interval

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between the guards in time of roving should be kept not farther than 2 meters. If encountered by the [] military police personnel, they were supposed to greet them exchanging cigarettes and short chat but should not hold unnecessary conversations. 50X1-HUM

Mark N: 2nd Guard Post, Conference Site: The post manned by an MIA security officer disguised himself as an NKPA senior private and a guard member from the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion whose rank was private or senior private was operated on a 24 hour basis. The responsibility of this post was to observe the quonsets of the [] Delegations of the NN&C to ascertain information regarding the number and type of persons and vehicles visiting the [] compounds in addition to watching the area of the Indian Flag-pole Hill and Kojong-san (figure 15 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report). The guards at this post were limited to move around within a radius of five meters from the post while keeping an interval between them not farther than two meters. 50X1-HUM

Mark O: The post manned by an MIA security officer disguised himself as an NKPA senior private and a guard whose rank was of private or senior private was operated on a 24 hour basis. The guards at this post moved to the Indian Flag-pole Hill at night. The mission of this post was to observe two farm villages located at BT 964013 and BT 970023 (6527 IV), in the southern half part of the DMZ, where the villagers were controlled by the UNC side. The guards were obliged to keep an observation diary to report the number and type of persons coming and going to the said villages to the Police Affairs Officer. These two villages were known to the MIA authorities as the base of the South Korean agents. What the MIA officers said to the guards was that the [] side sent its north-bound agents through these villages. The [] vehicles driven up to these villages turning their headlights on and off were often observed from the guard post. [] 50X1-HUM

Mark P: 3rd Guard Post, Conference Site: The post manned by an MIA security officer disguised himself as an NKPA senior private and a guard from the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion with the rank of private or senior private was operated on a 24 hour basis. The post assumed its responsibilities to observe the area extending from Hill No. 4 (figure 20 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report) to the UNC airport (figure 18 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report) including three US Military Police Guard Posts in the vicinity of the joint security area. The guards at this post were especially instructed to see the actions taken by the [] MPs. This guard post stopped the entire persons and vehicles coming from the conference hall area and from the 4th Guard Post (Mark Q) and heading for the south to check any North Korean fleeing to South Korea. However, the care in which the 50X1-HUM

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representatives of the NNIC were not to be bothered by the guards at this post. If the persons did not stop despite warning given by the guards at this post, the guards were entitled to use their weapons to force them to stop. All guard posts in and around the joint security area were always informed by the Police Affairs Officer who was staying in the Police Affairs Officer's Office nearby the conference hall by phone of what vehicles and persons regardless of nationality were staying in the joint security area and who and what vehicles were expected to come out of the joint security area to return either to North Korea or to South Korea. If a North Korean defector was fleeing in a car to come to South Korea without having stopped at the 4th Guard Post (Mark Q), the guards at the 3rd Post, which was the southmost post of the MIA authorities, must stop him, to the last making all possible efforts.

Mark Q:

4th Guard Post, Conference Site: The post manned by an MIA security officer disguised himself as an NKPA senior private and a guard from the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion with the rank of private or senior private was operated on a 24 hour basis. The duties of this post was to observe the area extending from Hill No. 2 to Hill No. 4 and to watch the activities taken by the elements of the [] side in the vicinity of the [] MP Guard Post near the P'hamun bridge to find out whether the [] side was unloading any north-bound agent. All North Korean vehicles going to the conference hall had to turn to the northeast at the 4th Guard Post. All North Korean vehicles, except for the cars in which the senior members of the Chinese MAC, NK MAC, and NNIC, were never allowed to proceed southward at the 4th Guard Post. The guards at the 4th Guard Post were instructed to use their weapons if anybody disregarded the warning given by the guards. The guards were limited to move within radius of five meters from the post for the purpose of observing the area of responsibility. An interval between the two guards should be kept not further than 2 meters. All incidents should be reported to the Police Affairs Officer on duty by phone right away.

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Mark R:

2nd Guard Post, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion: The post consisting of two guards was attached to the 2nd Check Point, Conference Site (figure 11 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1 of this report) to help security officers of the check point. The guards consisted of private or senior private. The guards should follow the instruction of the security officers while on duty. No sooner had the guards found any North Korean vehicles coming toward the 2nd Check Point at a distance than they ought to inform the security officers of the vehicles' coming if the security officers were resting in the guard shed. The guards had no authority to pass the vehicles without having permission from the security officers. The guard opened the gate of the check point by order of the security officers. The guards should observe the area extending from Hill No. 4 (figure 20 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1) to Hill No. 5 (figure 21 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1) and

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watch the riverside of Sach'on-gang to find out whether anyone was crossing the river to defect to South Korea or to infiltrate into North Korea. Whatever was observed by the guards must be informed verbally to the security officers at the check point so that the information could be reported to the Police Affairs Officer on duty by phone right away. The guards were permitted to rove around the area within a radius of five meters from the post for the purpose of observation.

Mark S: 1st Guard Post, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion: The post consisting of two guards on each shift whose ranks were private or senior private was attached to the 1st Check Point (figure 3 of the sketch, Enclosure No. 1), where two security officers were assigned, to help the security officers at the check point. In this connection, the guards were obliged to obey the orders of the security officers. The guards were on duty at this post from 0800 till 1900 hours every day by two shift. The duties of the guards were to observe the road leading to Kaesong in order to inform the security officers at the check point of the vehicles and people's coming toward the check point in addition to watching the surrounding area within a radius of 100 meters from the post. The guards had no authority to check the visitors and vehicles heading for the MIA responsible area of the DMZ including the joint security area, but the entire checkup was conducted by the security officers. The guards opened the entrance gate of the check point by the order of security officers. The second shift of the guards arrived at the post in company with the leader of the sentinals at about 1400 hours, and the relief was made under consent of the security officers. The guards who were released from the post were accompanied to the company by way of the Guard Office. The relieving procedures for the 2nd and 3rd Guard Post, 1st Guard Company were the same as that of the 1st Guard Post.

2. Explanation of the sketch depicting the facilities of the P'ennung Conference Site Police Affairs Department, Kaesong Security Division, Guard Bureau, MIA and the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegations. NN&C - Enclosure No. 2 of this report:

() Note: The location of these facilities was indicated as Figure 9 of Enclosure No. 1.)

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Figure 1: Garage, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure, with whitewashed earthen walls for the three sides of the building leaving the eastern side of the building open, and with a gabled roof of slates, measuring 6 meters wide, 13 meters long, and 4 meters high. There were three jeeps, three sedans (Pobeda), and two trucks, all of which were of Soviet make. Those vehicles and several North Korean civilian drivers were provided by the NK MAC headquarters.

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- Figure 2:** Gasoline Storehouse, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure with whitewashed earthen walls and a gabled roof of slates, measuring 6 meters wide, 7 meters long, and 3.5 meters high, in which five to six drums of gasoline were usually stored. In charge of the storehouse was an NK civilian driver who drove the sedan for the senior member, Czechoslovakian Delegation. Besides the man in charge of the storehouse, no one was allowed to enter this storehouse. When the door was open, the guard assigned to the 1st Guard Post of the Czechoslovakian Compound (Mark A) confirmed the number of gasoline drums being stored at the presence of the person in charge of the storehouse and the leader of the sentinals.
- Figure 3:** Automobile Repair Shop, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure with reed-mat walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 14 meters long, and 4 meters high, in which the NK civilian drivers serving with the Czechoslovakian Delegation repaired the cars.
- Figure 4:** Office and living quarters of the Czechoslovakian radio operators: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls coated with cement, and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which a senior sergeant and a private of the Czechoslovakian Army who were radio operators were said to be keeping radio contacts with their home Government. They slept in this building, too.
- Figure 5:** Storehouse, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure with reed-mat walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which the stationery and clothing supplies were being stored.
- Figure 6:** Office of the Chief of the Staff, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 8 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which the Chief of the Staff and a few officers of the Czechoslovakian Delegation worked from 0700 till 2000 hours. During the hours between 2000 hours and 0700 hours of the following day, two senior privates belonging to the 1st Guard Company, Keeping Guard Battalion, one of whom was a diehard member of the Korean Labor Party and the other a zealot of the Korean Democratic Youth League stayed in this office to guard it. Those two guards were permanently assigned to perform such duties.
- Figure 7:** Living quarters and office of the senior member, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which there was an office of the senior

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member, Czechoslovakian Delegation and there were some rooms available to the senior member and his wife for living. No Korean except KANG Sang-ho, senior member, NK MAC and female housekeepers were authorized to enter the building.

Figure 8: Living quarters, Czechoslovakian representatives, NNSC: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which an unknown number of Czechoslovakian representatives were staying.

Figure 9: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 8 meters wide, 13 meters long, and 3 meters high. The east-west portion of the building was partitioned into three parts, of which a room was occupied by three MIA escorting officers assigned to the Czechoslovakian Delegation, another room was occupied by six members of a Signal Squad belonged to the NK MAC, and a third by 4-5 North Korean civilian drivers who served for the Czechoslovakian Delegation. The western side of the building was occupied by the Guard Office of the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion, which was responsible for guarding the facilities and members of the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegations of the NNSC, and MIA responsible area of the northern half part of the DMZ to arrest South Korean against heading for the north and south-bound North Korean deserters by operating the guard posts day and night and the listening posts where the ambush patrolmen performed their observation duties at night. The following were the persons who were in the Guard Office on each shift: 1) Chief of the Guard (Wibyeong-jang): He was one of the Platoon leaders, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion, whose rank was junior lieutenant or lieutenant, who received instructions jointly from the Commanding Officer of the 1st Guard Company and the Police Affairs officer of the Conference Site Police Affairs Department. He was responsible for the entire accidents occurred at the guard posts under his command while he was on duty, and accordingly, he had to grasp the activities taken by the guards, ambush patrolmen, Leader of the Sentinels, scouts, and Deputy Chief of the Guards under his command. He had to command the members of the 1st Guard Company in quenching any fires which occurred while he was on duty within the MIA responsible area of the DMZ. He was obliged to report to the Police Affairs Officer and the 1st Guard Company Commander in case of receiving any report from the guards and ambush patrolmen. If he was requested by the ambush patrol teams to send reinforcements to withhold aggressive forces, he should request his Company Commander to mobilize the men power required. He should also request his Company Commander to send an extra guard when any of the guards on duty was reported to have been sick. Until the arrival of the replacement, he sent one of the two scouts, who used to standby in the Guard Office, to the

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appropriate guard post to replace the sick man. He sent either a scout or a Leader of the Sentinels to the guard posts whenever he wanted to instruct something for all of sudden. Since no telephone was available to the guard posts in the surrounding area of the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegation compounds, the guards were required to give signals by using electric buzzers or whistles in time of need to talk to the Leader of Sentinels or the Chief of the Guards. He was relieved after serving 24 straight hours. 2) Deputy Chief of the Guard (Punibwng-jang): He was one of the assistant platoon leaders, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion, whose rank was senior sergeant. His duty was to assist the Chief of the Guards. He was also relieved after serving 24 hours. He and the Chief of the Guards actually rested one after another during the duty hours in the light of long duty hours. 3) Leader of the Sentinels (Poch'o-jang): Two Leaders of the Sentinels served in the Guard Office on each shift under the command of the Chief of the Guards. Senior privates were eligible to be appointed the Leaders of the Sentinels. They were relieved every six hours. They had to accompany the guards between the Guard Office and the Guard Posts when the guards were relieved. One of them inspected the guard posts in the area of the Czechoslovakian compound and the other inspected the guard posts in the area of the Polish compound once in three hours. If they found anything during their inspection, they reported it to the Chief of the Guards. 4) Scouts: Two scouts with the rank of senior private or junior sergeant were assigned to the Guard Office on each shift, relieving every six hours. A scout used to make a scouting trip once every three hours in addition to emergency runs. Whatever was found during their scouting should be reported to the Chief of the Guards. 5) Guards: The guards belonging to the Guard Office consisted of privates or senior privates. They were usually relieved every three hours.

Figure 10: Garage, Conference Site Police Affairs Department: Two jeep (Soviet, GAZ-69) used for transporting guards and a jeep (same type as above) used by Chief, Conference Site Police Affairs Department only, all driven by civilian drivers hired by the NK MAC, were kept in the garage. A single story wooden structure with wooden walls for three sides of the building leaving the southern side of the building open, and with a gabled tin roof, measuring 5 meters wide, 7 meters long, and 3 meters high.

Figure 11: Office of the Conference Site Police Affairs Department: This was a wooden building with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 12 meters in total length, and 3 meters high. The eastern part of the building was used as a lecture hall in which various lectures including study meetings were held. There was a long corridor inside the southern walls of the western part of the building. The western part of the building was partitioned to be

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used for such offices as follows: from left: Office of Chief, Conference Site Police Affairs Department; Office of Personnel Deputy Chief of the department; Office of Guard Deputy Chief of the department; Office of the Police Affairs Officers of the department; and Office of the Security Officers of the department.

Figure 12: Mess hall, Czechoslovakian Delegation: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 12 meters in total length, and 3 meters high. A Chinese civilian cook and 3-4 Korean civilian cooks worked for this mess hall. In charge of the mess hall was a Czechoslovakian.

Figure 13: Office and living quarters utilized by a married couple of Czechoslovakian representatives: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high. About a third of this building in the east was used by the wife of the couple, a typist, as her office. Her rank was junior lieutenant and her husband whose rank was captain was also a member of the Czechoslovakian Delegation. The rest of the building was the living quarters of the couple.

Figure 14 and 15: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high. The half part of the building in the west (figure 14) was divided into two bath rooms which operated day and night. All North Korean civilian workers in the service of the Czechoslovakian and Polish compounds and the MIA security officers assigned to the Conference Site Police Affairs Department were allowed to use the bath rooms for two fixed days each week. The Czechoslovakian and Polish representative took baths for the rest of the week. The other half part of the building (figure 15) was a laundry shop in which three Korean laundrywomen, employees of the NK MAC, who were engaged in washing the clothing of the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegations in addition to the laundry of the unmarried MIA security officers.

Figure 16: Boiler shop: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 7 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 4 meters high. A boiler was installed in the shop. The shop provided with the steam heat for all buildings utilized by the Czechoslovakian Delegation, from Figure 1 through 17 of the sketch shown in Enclosure No. 2. The boiler was heated with bituminous coal by two Korean boilermen employed by the NK MAC.

Figure 17: Club: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 8 meters wide, 16 meters long, and 5 meters high. Dinner parties were frequently held either by the Czechoslovakian Delegation or the Polish Delegation at the club.

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Soviet, Czechoslovakian, Polish, Red Chinese, and North Korean films were shown three or four times each month in the presence of the Czechoslovakian and Polish representatives, MIA security officers, and all Korean employees in the service of the said two RNSC delegations.

- Figure 18: Korean Mess Hall: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls and a gabled roof of slates, measuring approximately 5 meters wide, 10 meters long, and 3 meters high. The mess hall served meals for the unmarried MIA security officers, Korean employees in the service of the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegations, members of a Signal Squad belonged to the NK MAC. Two male and three female cooks worked for the mess hall.
- Figure 19: Storehouse, Polish Delegation: A single story wooden structure with reed-mat walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high where the clothing and stationery were stored.
- Figure 20: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high. A small office for two MIA escorting officers attached to the Polish representatives was placed in the west of the building and the rest of the building was utilized by the male and female cooks working in the Korean mess hall as their quarters.
- Figure 21: Living quarters and office of the Polish radio operators: The structure of the building was the same as that of Figure 20 above. The number of radio operators was unknown. They were believed to be communicating with their home country by radio. 50X1-HUM
- Figure 22: Office of the two members of the Polish Delegation: The structure of the building was the same as that of Figure 20 above. The building was divided into two parts, of which the eastern room was an office in which a female and a male Polish representatives were holding clerical works, while the western room was used as lounge where simple banquets were often held by the Polish representatives themselves.
- Figure 23: Living quarters of the Polish representatives: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 12 meters long, and 3 meters high. The number of persons living at this quarters was unknown.
- Figure 24: The structure of the building was the same as that of Figure 23 above. The building was divided into two parts, of which one side was the office of the senior member, Polish Delegation, and the other side was the bed rooms for the senior member and the Chief of the Staff, Polish Delegation.

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Figure 25: Office of the ordinary members of the Polish Delegation: The structure of the building was the same as that of Figure 24 above.

Figure 26: Polish Mess Hall: A single story structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 13 meters long, and 3 meters high, in which four Korean cooks and a Chinese cook were working for the Polish representatives. These employees were hired by the NK MAC. In charge of the mess hall was a Polish national.

Figure 27: Boiler shop: A single story wooden structure with cement walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 8 meters long, and 4 meters high, in which a boiler serving for the entire buildings of the Polish Delegation was installed. Two Korean boilermen were working in the shop. The boiler was heated with bituminous coal.

Figure 28: Office of the Chief of the Staff, Polish Delegation: The structure and size of the building were the same as those of Figure 25 above.

Figure 29: Garage of the Polish Delegation: A single story wooden structure with earthen walls coated with lime for three sides of the building while leaving the northern side of the building open without having any door or wall, in which were three trucks, two jeeps, and 3-4 Robada (sedan) [redacted] Those vehicles were driven by Korean civilian drivers hired by the NK MAC for the members of Polish Delegation. 50X1-HUM

Figure 30: Gasoline Storehouse, Polish Delegation: A single story wooden structure with wooden walls and a gabled tin roof, measuring 6 meters wide, 8 meters long, and 5 meters high. No one except Chief of the storehouse, a Polish national, was allowed to enter this storehouse. There were several drums of gasoline to be provided for the vehicles used by the Polish representatives.

Figure 31: Water tank: A huge water tank with unknown capacity was placed on a ten meter high wooden tower. The water tank supplied water to all buildings in both Czechoslovakian and Polish compounds for washing and cleaning use. The purified drinking water for the said two foreign delegation was brought by water truck from Kaesong city.

3. Travel, replacement, and other relative information on the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegation, INSC:

- 1) They irregularly traveled as far as Kaesong, P'yongyang, and famous scenic places in NK including Ryngang-san under the escort of the MIA escorting officers.

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- 2) The senior members of both delegation were rotated after a little over year of their services in Korea, while the ordinary members of the delegation were rotated semiannually [redacted]
 - 3) Each of the said two delegations had approximately ten members. This 50X1-HUM number should be identical with that of either [redacted] Delegation.
 - 4) Each Delegation of the Czechoslovakia and Poland detailed a liaison officer to the conference hall every morning. As of 17 October 1958, a male captain acted as the liaison officer of the Czechoslovakian Delegation and a female whose rank was unknown [redacted] represented the Polish Delegation. 50X1-HUM
 - 5) All members of the Czechoslovakian and Polish Delegation were versed in Russian language so that they always spoke Russian among the members of the two nations.
4. Activities of the ambush teams at the listening posts in the MIA responsible area:
- 1) Organization of the team and duty hours: There were five listening posts in this area as indicated in the sketch shown in Enclosure No. 1 of this report. Until about August 1957, an ambush team had consisted of an MIA security officer and a member from a guard company, Kaesong Guard Battalion. However, since September 1957, a team has been organized by three men of the guard company (1st or 2nd), Kaesong Guard Battalion which was in active in the area. Of the three men, one was squad leader and the other two were senior private or private. The former was called the ambush team leader and the latter, the ambush team members. Each listening post was operated by three shift from dusk to dawn and the post was kept by an ambush team on each shift. In this connection, a team served for about three hours at a time each night. The serving hours could be changed in accordance with the seasons and wheather. During the winter of 1957, each listening post was operated every night by four shift for the time being in the light of longer hours of darkness.
 - 2) Equipment and arms: The team leader was armed with a Soviet made pistol carrying 16 rounds of ammunition while the team members were armed with Russian rifles with 15 rounds of ammunition respectively. The team leader and members possessed a policeman's rope respectively. The team leader carried a signal rope and a field telephone, while the team members carried wire warning devices while marching toward the designated listening posts.
 - 3) Briefing: All ambush team leaders were briefed by the Police Affairs Officer on duty an hour before leaving for their listening posts on how to conduct the ambush duties on that night. Shortly before leaving for their listening posts, the team leaders conveyed the instructions of the Police Affairs Officer to their respective team members. Such instructions consisted of: 1) Whatever situation was reported by the guard posts in the MIA responsible area of the DMZ during the daylight; 2) Any suspect who appeared to be bound for South Korea was found to have been approaching toward the responsible

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MIA responsible area; 3) The possible infiltration of South Korea agents into a pinpoint place within the MIA responsible area on the coming night based on the information acquired by the Conference Site Police Affairs Department. In addition, each ambush team leader checked physical condition of his members beforehand especially to find out whether any of his members had been suffering from an ailment (cough in particular). The team leader also briefed the team members that the member who was to walk at the head of the team should watch the front and right side while the one who was to walk at the tail of the team should watch the back and left side in the course of marching between the Guard Office and the listening post at night. The team leader then settled the positions to be kept by the men of the team at the listening post when arriving the post. The three man team was to be deployed in a triangle form with reciprocal distances of 5-6 meters.

- 4) Departure for the listening post and withdrawal from the listening post: The ambush team left the Guard Office, 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion (Figure 9 of the sketch shown in Enclosure N. 2 of this report) for the listening post upon being ordered by the Chief of the Guards on duty who had authority to issue such an order only when approved by the Police Affairs Officer on duty, Conference Site Police Affairs Department. When the 2nd shift of the ambush team was about to leave for the listening post to relieve the 1st shift, the 1st shift was informed by the Guard Officer by phone of the departure of the 2nd shift. The 3rd shift was no exception. The final shift was not supposed to leave the listening post unless ordered by the Chief of the Guards even the day broke. The Chief of the Guards issued an order of withdrawal after having an approval of the Police Affairs Officer on duty.
- 5) At the listening post: As soon as the team arrived at the listening post, the team leader connected his telephone to a telephone line which had been laid on the ground, and then reported the arrival of the team at its destination to the Chief of the Guards on duty. Next, the team leader approached to his members one by one quietly and instructed them in soft voice on how to arrest the suspects and where to detour to trace the suspects in case the suspects ran away upon being discovered by the team. The ambush team members were granted by their leader to shoot the suspects if it was hopeless for them to catch the suspects alive. In case more than three suspects were sighted, the team leader was required to call up the Chief of the Guards to receive an order for an action whether to arrest the suspects or to leave them alone to proceed further northward in order to let them be arrested in the rear area where sufficient number of troops were available. The team leader should have briefed his members in advance telling them who should shoot the suspect coming ahead of them and who should shoot the suspect coming behind them, who should intercept the road in order not to allow the suspects to flee, who should tie them up if possible to catch them alive, and who should keep the telephone to maintain constant liaison with the Guard Office. All ambush teams were strictly warned not to touch or dispose any documents or belongings of the dead, captured suspect, or escaped suspects on the

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pretext of the fact that the investigation authorities would obtain fingerprints from such materials. While performing the ambush duties at the listening post, a signal rope was lined up among the three men of the team holding it in a hand of each individual. If any of the team members found any suspect, he should pull the rope continuously in order to inform his leader of it. They pulled the rope twice frequently to check with one another whether anything was found or not, but this signal actually established for warning one another not to asleep. The means of signal could be set up differently and could be changed among the men of the team. The team leader was free to come to each of his members to inform him of the sighting of the suspect or instruct him from time to time.

The first shift of the ambush team installed the wire warning devices while heading for the listening post. The third shift which was the final shift was responsible for carrying telephone and wire warning device materials back to the Guard Office when withdrawing from the listening post. The ambush team laid the wire warning device on the ground to notice an appearance of pedestrian.

- 6) Inspection: Other than ambush teams, no roving patrol duty was performed in the MIA responsible area of the DMZ at night. However, during the week of an emergency alert which was held on a national holiday, either Commander of the 1st Guard Company, Kaesong Guard Battalion or the Police Affairs Officer, Conference Site Police Affairs Department made irregular inspection trips in the area at night by jeep or on foot. On such occasions, prior notice was given to each listening post by the Chief of the Guards on duty.

5. Password:

- 1) Among the elements of the MIA themselves within the MIA responsible area of the northern half part of the DMZ, the numerical adding system of password was used at night. The numerical figure of the password settled by the Police Affairs Officer, Conference Site Police Affairs Department was different each night. If the figure 10 was the password for the night, the guard, for example, could give an yell to a pedestrian "seven." In reply to the yell, the latter should have given the figure "three" to make ten. If figure 4 was given by the former, the latter should have given back figure 6 to make ten.

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the numerical figure for the password used to be settled below 50.

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- 2) A different password system was used between the elements of the MIA and the DMZ policemen of the NKPA within the MIA responsible area. The former utilized the names of weapons like Posh'ong (rifle) or Kyonggi (light machinegun) and the latter used the names of cities in North Korea like P'yongyang or Hamhung. When the DMZ policemen were to pass through the MIA responsible area, the Commanding Officer of the

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DMZ Police Company was required to give a phone call to the Conference Site Police Affairs Department beforehand. Accordingly, the Police Affairs Officer of the department informed the check points or guard posts of their passage in advance through the Chief of the Guards. The DMZ policemen were not permitted to pass the MIA responsible area without obtaining prior consent of the Conference Site Police Affairs Department. When the DMZ policemen, who were also required to walk in three man group or more man group, reached close to the MIA guard, the guard could say to the DMZ policemen "light machinegun". Then, the DMZ policemen should answer "P'yongyang". This password was settled between the Commanding Officers of the DMZ police companies deployed on both sides of the MIA responsible area and the Chief, Conference Site Police Affairs Department. The password was renewed every two or three months irregularly.

6. Document checks in the MIA responsible area of the DMZ:

The document checks were merely conducted at the 1st check point (figure 3 of Enclosure No. 1 of this report) throughout the whole area of the MIA responsibility. The farmers who were engaged in farming in the MIA responsible area during the daylight entered and left the DMZ through the check points of the DMZ police companies under the escort of the MIA security officers so that they never were checked on their documents in the area. Since no civilian was dwelling in the area and all farmers ought to leave the area at night, any civilian appearing in the area at night must be escorted to the Guard Office unconditionally and were then evacuated to the Kaesong Security Division without checking their identification. In this connection, the MIA guards never were instructed how to conduct document checks in the area. Even the checkup on the documents at the 1st check point was conducted by the MIA security officers not by the guards.

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ENCLOSURE No. 2

**Sketch of the Facilities of the Conference Site Police Affairs Department
and of the Czechs and Polish Delegations of the HNSC
(Refer to Figure 9 of the Enclosure #1)**

